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INTRODUCTION                                                                                                                      
On December 20, 1999, correctional officers Mike Blot and 
Francisco Caraballo stopped and frisked Nathaniel Sims while he was 
incarcerated at New York’s Sing Sing Correctional Facility.1  The 
officers told Sims to face the wall, place his hands behind his back, 
and remove his shoes and pants.2  As Sims began taking his pants off, 
Blot punched him in the back of his head and took him to the 
ground.3  Carabello proceeded to kick, stomp, and punch Sims.4  As 
Sims suffered through the attack, Carabello shouted, “You hit a f—-
ing officer, you piece of s—-, we’ll kill you.”5  Carabello then pulled 
out a pocket knife and swung it at Sims.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 2. Id. (quoting Pro Se Complaint Item IV). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  Carabello was accompanied by several other officers who were not named 
in the lawsuit. Id. 
 5. Id. at 121. 
 6. Id. 
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Sims sued the officers and Sing Sing prison.7  Although the district 
court dismissed Sims’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies under section 7 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA),8 the parties had already engaged in substantial discovery.9  
During Sims’s deposition, he discussed his subsequent placement in 
Sing Sing’s psychiatric satellite unit (PSU) and his emotional injuries: 
fear of correctional officers holding knives, dreaming about the 
incident, and fear of being cut by an officer.10  Defendants sought 
Sims’s psychiatric records, and Sims objected on grounds that the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege protected the records.11 
The magistrate judge held that Sims had waived his 
psychotherapist-patient privilege because fear of knives was not 
“garden variety” emotional distress—a category of judicially 
determined emotions usually protected by the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.12  Further, the defendants contended that the 
psychiatric records contained vital information for their defense, such 
as Sims suffering from mental illness rather than fear of defendants.13  
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district 
court.  The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs do not forfeit a 
privilege—not subject to a balancing test of party needs—by merely 
asserting a claim for injuries, which may include depression or 
anxiety.14  Further, the court stated, the defense cannot overcome the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege when they place the plaintiff’s 
mental state in issue.15  To hold otherwise would eviscerate the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.16 
Civil rights violations and damages from such violations rarely 
depend on mental health history.  Yet, the suggestion that a plaintiff 
has a mental disorder has proven a powerful defense in civil rights 
cases.17  Unlike character evidence and sexual history, courts often 
permit defendants’ introduction of mental health histories to prove 
alternative theories of causation and even to discredit civil rights 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See id.  
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2013). 
 9. See In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 121. 
 10. Id. at 122-24. 
 11. Id. at 124. 
 12. Id. at 124-25; see also infra Part II.E. 
 13. In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 127. 
 14. Id. at 134. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff: Psychiatric 
Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 750, 751 (2010). 
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plaintiffs.18  When courts admit a plaintiff’s mental health records as 
evidence, they operate under the assumption that the plaintiff 
implicitly waived his or her psychotherapist-patient privilege.19  These 
admissions frequently go unexamined, unquestioned, and 
unregulated.20 
This Note considers whether incarcerated persons waive their 
psychotherapist-patient privilege upon filing civil rights claims against 
correctional institutions for mental or emotional injury.  Scholarship 
on the subject has mostly focused on employment discrimination and 
sexual harassment.21  This Note analyzes the scope of waiver for the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the context of prison litigation.  
Part I of this Note provides background for this unique analysis and 
reviews the rights of the incarcerated under the Eighth Amendment 
of the Constitution.22  These rights include the right to adequate 
medical and mental health care, the right to be free from assault and 
battery, and the right to access courts.  Part I also reviews the law 
governing evidentiary privileges and closes with the Supreme Court’s 
codification of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
Part II of this Note surveys the circuit split (and divergent district 
courts) on waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Courts 
have adopted “broad” and “narrow” approaches as well as a “middle 
view” compromise in assessing whether to waive the psychotherapist-
patient privilege when a plaintiff claims mental or emotional injury.  
Finally, Part III of this Note analyzes the three approaches to waiver 
through tort law, civil rights litigation policy, and normative 
frameworks.  Part III critiques the “garden variety” approach for 
imposing normative limitations on the subjective experience of 
incarcerated persons who experience civil rights violations.  Such 
limitations reinforce bias and stigma, carry a potential to discriminate 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See id. at 752. 
 19. Id. at 751. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Mara Kent & Thomas Kent, Michigan Civil Rights Claimants: 
Should They Be Required to Give Up Their Physician-Patient Privilege When 
Alleging Garden-Variety Emotional Distress?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479 
(2000); Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the 
Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 
DEPAUL L. REV. 79 (2008) [hereinafter An Uncertain Privilege]; Smith, supra note 
17; Ellen E. McDonnell, Note, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow 
Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 1369 (2001). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”). 
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against persons with mental illness, and fail to consider the context of 
incarceration. 
This Note concludes that the narrow approach to waiver would be 
necessary to effectuate the policy of civil rights statutes to make 
plaintiffs “private attorneys general.”  Although sensible in many 
circumstances, the middle view’s limitation of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege to “garden variety” emotional distress devalues the 
subjective experience of incarceration, as well as histories of violence-
induced trauma, oppression, poverty, and racial disparities in the 
justice system. 
I.  CIVIL RIGHTS, EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, AND THE 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
The United States leads the world in incarceration.23  In 2012, 
prisons and jails housed 2.2 million people, a population that has 
increased over five hundred percent in the last forty years.24  Such a 
rapid expansion of the prison population has resulted in prison 
overcrowding and fiscal burdens on the state that, ultimately, affect 
the living conditions and health needs of incarcerated persons.25  For 
example, California’s Receiver—the person appointed by the court to 
oversee remedial efforts in state prisons—noted that overcrowding 
and staff shortages created “regular ‘crisis’ situations,” which 
increased incidences of infectious disease, prison violence, and 
inhibited the delivery of medical care.26 
A. Mass Incarceration and Mental Illness 
Persons with mental illness are overrepresented in corrections.27  
Experts estimate that 200,000 to 400,000 persons with mental illness 
                                                                                                                 
 23. The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, 1, 2 (Nov. 
2015), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_
Fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3SK-SG8X].  The United States leads the world in 
incarceration (716 per 100,000), followed by Rwanda (492 per 100,000), Russia (475 
per 100,000), Brazil (274 per 100,000), and Australia (130 per 100,000). Id. at 1. 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917-19 (2011). 
 26. Id. at 1926-27. 
 27. Human Rights Watch, Ill Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental 
Illness § 3 (last updated Sept. 2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/ 
[https://perma.cc/D5F4-XS52].  Approximately 2.3%-3.9% of incarcerated persons 
have schizophrenia or a psychotic disorder; 13.1%-18.6% suffer from major 
depression; 2.1%-4.3% have bipolar disorder; 8.4%-13.4% exhibit dysthymia; 6.2%-
11.7% have post-traumatic stress disorder; and 22%-30.1% have an anxiety disorder. 
Id. (quoting National Commission on Correctional Health Care, The Health Status of 
Soon-to-be-Released Inmates, A Report to Congress 1, 22 (Mar. 2002), 
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are currently incarcerated, which is 8%–19% of the prison population, 
while mental illness appears in about 5% of the U.S. population.28  
Mental health professionals frequently link the mass incarceration of 
persons with mental illness to inadequate community mental health 
services and criminal justice policies that punish unemployment, 
homelessness, and poverty.29  Drug policy has also played a significant 
role.30  Because many persons with mental illness cannot access 
adequate mental health treatment, they turn to substance abuse to 
control their behavior.31  As a result, 25%–40% of all mentally ill 
persons in the United States can expect to engage with the criminal 
justice system at some point in their lives.32 
1. Stigma and Mental Illness 
Persons with mental illness are more likely to experience stigma, 
discrimination, and segregation from the general population.33  
Society generally sees persons with mental illness as “shameful, 
dangerous, and irresponsible.”34  Stigma and discrimination are often 
implacable barriers to social inclusion and recovery.35  Legal 
institutions also have difficulty in shedding assumptions about mental 
illness, especially the view that disabilities are limited only to the 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.ncchc.org/filebin/Health_Status_vol_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/72LH-
YZXB]. 
 28. Id. 
 29. LIZ SAYCE, FROM PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT TO CITIZEN, OVERCOMING 
DISCRIMINATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 19 (2000) (noting that in the United States, 
70%-90% of persons with mental disabilities are unemployed or not seeking work); 
Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, §3. 
 30.  See The Sentencing Project, supra note 23, § 3. 
 31. See generally Ralph M. Rivera, Note, The Mentally Ill Offender: A Brighter 
Tomorrow Through the Eyes of the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime 
Reduction Act of 2004, 19 J.L. & HEALTH, 107 (2004-2005). 
 32. Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, § 3. 
 33. Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 585, 586-87 (2003). 
 34. Id. at 587; see also Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(a)(1) (2012) (finding that people with mental disabilities have been precluded 
from “all aspects of society . . . because of discrimination” and others with a record 
disability have been subjected to similar discrimination); Susan Stefan, The American 
With Disabilities Act and Mental Health Law: Issues for the Twenty-First Century, 
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 131, 136, 145 (1999) (noting state mental health 
systems are predicated on “sanism,” which segregates and stigmatizes people with 
mental disabilities). 
 35. See, e.g., Bruce G. Link et al., Stigma as Barrier to Recovery: The 
Consequences of Stigma for the Self-Esteem of People with Mental Illnesses, 52 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1621 (2001). 
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physically observable disabilities.36  For example, tort law holds 
persons with physical disabilities to “a reasonably prudent person 
with the same physical disability” standard while rejecting similar 
standards for persons with mental disabilities.37 
2. Access to Mental Health Care in Prison 
Prisons and jails have a legal duty to provide adequate mental 
health services to the people in their custody.38  The legal duty placed 
on correctional institutions runs in contrast to the common law’s 
understanding that healthcare providers have “no obligation” to 
provide care absent a special relationship (i.e., the physician-patient 
relationship).39  Although individuals do not have a constitutional 
right to medical care,40 an exception exists for those subject to state 
action that impedes access to medical services. 
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
the Supreme Court articulated this principle by holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not impose an 
affirmative obligation on a social worker to prevent child abuse, even 
when the social worker “had reason to believe” abuse was 
occurring.41  The Due Process Clause protects against undue 
government interference, but it does not confer an entitlement to 
government aid.42 
DeShaney, however, built in an exception for persons held in state 
custody against their will.43  Institutionalized persons are dependent 
on the state, and the state has “a corresponding duty to assume some 
responsibility for [their] safety and general well-being.”44  This 
exception became known as the DeShaney principle: the state has a 
legal duty to provide necessary medical care to persons under its 
control or custody.45  In other words, the government’s custody or 
control places a person in a worse situation (i.e., unable to access 
medical care) than that person would have been in with full legal 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Korn, supra note 33, at 589. 
 37. Id. at 618.  However, people with mental disabilities are excused from contract 
performance and may be found not guilty by reason of “insanity.” Id. at 617. 
 38. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
 39. See, e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
 40. See Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034-36 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that there is no constitutional right to medical care). 
 41. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989). 
 42. Id. at 196. 
 43. See id. at 200. 
 44. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 45. See id. at 199-200; see also Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1034. 
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liberty.46  Therefore, the state is responsible for the person subjected 
to the circumstances of state custody or control.47 
Correctional healthcare has its origins in the Supreme Court 
decision Estelle v. Gamble.48  In Estelle, the plaintiff, Gamble, was 
performing a prison work assignment for the Texas Department of 
Corrections when a bale of cotton fell on him.49  Physically unable to 
work and experiencing intense pain, Gamble refused orders to 
continue work.50  Prison staff responded by placing Gamble in 
solitary confinement to discipline his defiance.51  While in solitary 
confinement, Gamble experienced severe chest pains and frequently 
blacked out.52  Prison officials waited four days before sending a 
medical assistant to Gamble’s aid and a doctor on the fifth day.53  
After some treatment, Gamble “swore out his complaint” against 
Texas’s Department of Corrections and its officers.54 
The Supreme Court in Estelle held that “deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain’ that violates the Eighth Amendment.”55  
Furthermore, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes 
more than just “physically barbarous punishments”; it also embodies 
the basic concepts of dignity, humanity, and decency.56 
Once the Supreme Court established the state’s duty in Estelle and 
DeShaney, the Tenth Circuit first identified the necessary medical 
services to treat serious medical needs.57  In Ramos v. Lamm, Fidel 
Ramos began an action against the “totality of the conditions” at 
Canon City, Colorado’s state penitentiary (i.e., “Old Max”).58  The 
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief for numerous 
Eighth Amendment violations, including inadequate medical, dental, 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at 1035. 
 47. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. 
 48. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).  Correctional healthcare is the provision of medical care 
for persons in jails and prisons. Id. at 103. 
 49. Id. at 98-99. 
 50. Id. at 100-01. 
 51. Id. at 101. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 
104. 
 56. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. 
 57. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 58. Id. at 562.  The complaint was later amended as a class action. Id. 
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and psychiatric care.59  Ramos held that the constitutional obligation 
to provide medical care to incarcerated persons included medical care 
for physical ills, dental care, and psychological or psychiatric care.60  
Inadequate care in any of these fields, the Tenth Circuit held, violated 
the Eighth Amendment.61 
The evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence set a standard for 
all prisons and jails to employ mental health professionals; provide 
intervention services, psychiatric medication, and techniques for 
preventing suicide; and properly store adequate and confidential 
clinical records.62  In reality, many incarcerated persons with mental 
illness go untreated and decompensate into serious psychoses.63  
Those that do receive mental health services likely have the most 
severe mental health needs, which are usually determined through a 
screening procedure.64  Prison conditions and understaffing, however, 
disrupt psychological and psychiatric treatment.65  This is not to 
understate the presence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
anxiety, depression, and a sense of helplessness that affects many 
incarcerated persons.66  If a mental health concern goes untreated by 
a licensed mental health professional, many incarcerated persons seek 
counseling from other prison health workers, such as prison nurses.67  
Still, many incarcerated persons go without adequate mental 
healthcare—not to mention physical healthcare.68  It is no surprise, 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 574. 
 61. Id. at 575. 
 62. Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, § 3. 
 63. See Rivera, supra note 31, at 109-10; Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, § 3  
(quoting an anonymous prison psychiatrist, “[w]e are literally drowning in patients, 
running around trying to put our fingers in the bursting dikes, while hundreds of men 
continue to deteriorate psychiatrically before our eyes into serious psychoses”). 
 64. See Rivera, supra note 31, at 125. 
 65. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
 66. Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 259 (2013). 
 67. See In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2008).  Nathaniel Sims had sought 
assistance from a prison nurse and explained his fears and concerns to her about 
correctional officers. Id. at 123. 
 68. See Kelly Bedard & H.E. Frech III, Prison Health Care: Is Contracting Out 
Healthy?, (U.C. Santa Barbara Dep’t of Econ. 5, Working Paper No. 11, 2007) (citing 
MARGO SCHLANGER, INMATE LITIGATION: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY, NAT’L 
INST. OF CORRECTIONS INFO. CTR. (NICIC), LJN EXCHANGE (2003)) (noting the 
vagueness of the “reasonably adequate medical care” standard). 
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then, that inadequate medical care accounts for a significant portion 
of prison litigation.69 
B. Vindicating the Rights of the Incarcerated 
Incarcerated persons may vindicate their Eighth Amendment 
rights through civil litigation.70  Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 
1983”), they may sue state and federal officials who have violated 
their constitutional rights “under color of any” state law.71  Courts 
have described Section 1983 actions as a “species of tort liability.”72  
Tort law principles, therefore, help courts determine the relevant 
evidence that supports or limits a damage claim in a civil rights 
action.73  In general, plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for all 
damages proximately caused by the defendant(s) even if “aggravated 
by reason of a preexisting physical or mental condition.”74  Thus, a 
defendant may not use the plaintiff’s mental or emotional 
vulnerability to escape liability for aggravated mental or emotional 
distress damages.75 
The most litigated matters in prison litigation include physical 
assaults, inadequate medical care, due process violations in 
disciplinary sanctions, and living conditions, such as nutrition or 
sanitation.76  On their face, inmate complaints are anything but trivial 
or undeserving of serious concern.77  In 1995, prison litigation 
accounted for 19% of the federal civil docket (nearly 40,000 cases)—a 
reflection on prison conditions and the treatment of the 
incarcerated.78  However, the PLRA, which was a rider to an 
appropriations bill, reduced prison litigation by 43% in five years 
despite a concomitant 23% increase in the prison population overall.79  
This dramatic decline in prison litigation is attendant to the PLRA’s 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id.; see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 
1571 n.48 (2003) (noting that medical care cases make up 10.8% to 25% of all inmate 
litigation). 
 70. See Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1570-71. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 427-28 (1971). 
 72. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986). 
 73. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 122. 
 74. Id. at 122 (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D DAMAGES § 239 (2003)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1570-71. Incarcerated persons also litigate 
freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and access to courts or mail cases. Id. at 
1571. 
 77. Id. at 1573. 
 78. Id. at 1558. 
 79. Id. at 1559-60. 
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additional procedural hurdles imposed upon incarcerated persons 
rather than substantive reforms in correctional institutions.80 
1.  The PLRA’s Filing Fees 
One of the PLRA’s most imposing hurdles requires incarcerated 
litigants to pay filing fees for all actions, despite indigence, and 
requires “frequent filers” to pay all filing fees in advance.81  The 
PLRA’s filing fee provision conceptually operates within an economic 
theory of incentives.82  The fees are intended to deter potential 
plaintiffs from filing cases expected to yield values lower than the fee 
but would proceed with cases expected to yield higher values than the 
fee.83  Far from nominal, $150 court filing fees are equivalent to 
months or more of prison labor.84  If an incarcerated person does not 
succeed on the merits of their case, the filing fee comes out of their 
prison account.85 
Any incarcerated person may become a “frequent filer” after a 
court strikes down three of their claims.86  “Frequent filers” must pay 
the entire $150 fee in advance regardless of indigence.87  Congress 
intended to eliminate jailhouse lawyers from filing lawsuits or 
assisting other inmates in their lawsuits through the “frequent filer” 
provision.88  With the imposition of fees and “three-strike” penalties, 
the provision effectively eliminates litigation as a means to redress 
grievances and reduces an incarcerated person’s access to legal 
assistance.89 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 1644. 
 81. See id. at 1645; see also 42 U.S.C. §  1997e. The PLRA also limits attorney’s 
fees, which effectively reduces successful prisoner litigation. Schlanger, supra note 69, 
at 1654. 
 82. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1646. 
 83. Id. The “value” of the case is the chance of success and expected damages. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1646. The average minimum wage for prisoners paid by the states for 
non-industry work is $0.93 an hour. See Peter Wagner, The Prison Index, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (2003), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/prisonlabor.html. 
[https://perma.cc/UD96-A4RH]. 
 85. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1645. 
 86. See id. at 1649.  Schlanger notes that a “strike” may only entail failure to state 
a claim or dismissal as a frivolous lawsuit.  Losing on summary judgment or at trial 
would not count. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1648. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
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2.  The PLRA’s Mandate to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 
The PLRA’s highest hurdle requires incarcerated persons to 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing Section 1983 actions.90  
Prison grievance systems often have no time limit, no limit on 
procedural complexity or difficulty, and no rules to govern the 
grievance process.91  Administrative remedies all too often foreclose 
judicial review of constitutional violations.92  Moreover, the grievance 
process does not necessarily consider the “fit” between a claim for 
relief and the administrative remedies available.93  Incarcerated 
persons, therefore, are left with a complex and potentially unending 
set of obstacles before seeking redress for a civil rights violation. 
3.  The PLRA’s Limitation on Damages 
In addition to creating monetary and procedural obstacles, the 
PLRA effectively prohibits incarcerated persons from recovering for 
a mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical 
injury or the commission of a sexual act.94  This provision eliminates 
claims seeking relief from threats or poor living conditions.95  
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“Section 1997e(e)”) seemingly 
absolves prison officials from liability for mental and emotional 
injury, the provision does not preclude injunctive relief, which saves 
the statute from unconstitutionality.96  For example, an incarcerated 
person exposed to asbestos while working in a prison kitchen may not 
sue for mental or emotional injury without demonstrating a 
concomitant physical injury.97 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 1649; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to 
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a 
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted”). 
 91. See Amy Petre Hill, Death Through Administrative Indifference: The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act Allows Women to Die in California’s Substandard Prison 
Health Care System, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 223, 239-40 (2002). 
 92. Id. at 240-42. 
 93. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1651. 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“Limitation on recovery. No Federal civil action may be 
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for 
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 
physical injury or the commission of a sexual act”). 
 95. See Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1630. 
 96. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court 
Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (2001) (citing Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459 
(7th Cir. 1997)). 
 97. Zehner, 133 F.3d at 460-61. 
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Mental or emotional injuries are also ambiguous and undefined in 
the PLRA.98  Such injuries could range from “stress, fear, and 
depression” to deprivation caused by prison policies that prevent an 
incarcerated person from attending religious services,99 physical 
removal from ordinary prison life, and enforced idleness.100  Similar 
provisions exist under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)101 that 
prevent incarcerated persons from claiming mental or emotional 
injuries “without a prior showing of physical injury.”102  The laws 
governing prison litigation, for the most part, preclude or chill claims 
for mental or emotional injury.103  This Note recognizes the difficulty 
in putting forward these claims before turning to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. 
C. The Development of Evidentiary Privileges 
The justice system depends on fair and accurate evidence to 
resolve disputes.104  Its fundamental maxim is that “the public . . . has 
a right to every man’s evidence.”105  Evidentiary privileges, however, 
exempt certain information from the fact-finding process.106  A party 
in litigation may invoke a privilege during pre-trial discovery or 
attempt to compel testimony without losing the right to advance a 
claim or defense related to the privileged material.107 
Privilege law concerns “extrinsic social policy” that places certain 
values and social relationships above judicial truth-seeking and 
efficiency.108  Privileges safeguard privacy, freedom, trust, and honor 
in important social and professional relationships.109  Privileges also 
further certain professional interests by encouraging individual clients 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Boston, supra note 96, at 437. 
 99. See Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 100. Boston, supra note 96, at 438-39. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2014). 
 102. 28 US.C. § 1346(b)(2) (2013). 
 103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 
 104. 6 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 43.1 
(7th ed. 2014). 
 105. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 
2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 106. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); see generally 2 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5.2 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
 107. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.2. 
 108. Id. cf. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 547 (1827) 
(“Evidence is the basis for justice: exclude evidence and you exclude justice.”). 
 109. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.2. 
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to engage in open and candid communication.110  Additionally, they 
allow professionals to avoid the ethical dilemma of seeking 
information necessary for the delivery of services without placing 
their client at risk for future liability or embarrassment.111  
Evidentiary privileges, therefore, promote a public good that 
transcends “the normally predominant principle of utilizing all 
rational means for ascertaining truth [in court].”112 
The types of recognized privileges vary among state courts and 
between state and federal courts.113  To determine whether a privilege 
exists, lawmakers and scholars often employ a four-part test 
developed by the Dean of Northwestern Law School, John Henry 
Wigmore, who became well known in the early twentieth century 
after publication of his treatise on evidence.114  The test considers the 
following factors: (1) whether communication in the usual 
circumstances of a professional relationship originates “in a 
confidence that it will not be disclosed”;115 (2) the necessity of 
confidentiality to achieve the purpose of the professional 
relationship;116 (3) whether the relationship should be fostered;117 
and, (4) whether fear of disclosure may cause greater injury to the 
professional relationship than the expected benefit in obtaining 
testimony.118  Wigmore’s test has influenced legislators and courts for 
decades and has effectively limited evidentiary privileges to a small 
handful of relationships, such as the attorney-client relationship.119 
Wigmore opposed evidentiary privileges.120  He took a strict 
rationalist and empirical approach to evidence and questioned 
“humanistic rationales” for privileges.121  Wigmore’s texts still 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 50 (1980)). 
 113. Christina L. Lewis, Note, The Exploitation of Trust: The Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege in Alaska as Applied to Prison Group Therapy, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 
295, 298 (2001) (citing STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 
647 (2000)). 
 114. Id. at 297-98; 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON 
LAW § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
 115. Lewis, supra note 113, at 298. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (citing RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 10 (1966)). 
 119. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 91 n.57. 
 120. Id. at 91. 
 121. Id. 
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influence judicial opinions as courts tend to disfavor privileges as 
impediments to the truth-seeking process and construe such privileges 
strictly.122  For example, when state legislatures began enacting 
physician-patient privileges, courts and legal scholars vociferously 
resisted its inclusion in the Model Code of Evidence because “secrecy 
in court is prima facie calamitous.”123  However, attorneys from 
jurisdictions that enacted legislation to create the privilege lobbied for 
its inclusion, which eventually led to a compromise through a broad 
“patient-litigant exception.”124  If a patient’s condition is an element 
or factor in a lawsuit, then the patient loses their physician-patient 
privilege because the condition has been disclosed to the world 
through the suit itself.125 
D. Federal Rules of Evidence and Privilege 
The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to evidentiary privileges in 
federal civil rights litigation.126  In Article V of the Proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence, the House Committee on the Judiciary originally 
set forth thirteen rules related to evidentiary privileges.127  Nine rules 
define specific privileges that fall outside the privileges already 
enumerated in the Constitution,128 and three others addressed 
collateral problems related to the waiver of privilege.129  The House, 
however, eliminated all thirteen proposed rules and replaced them 
with one: Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (Rule 501).130  Rule 501 
provided that “[t]he common law—as interpreted by United States 
courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of 
privilege” unless the Constitution, federal statute, or Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 92. 
 123. Id. (quoting Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice 
Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor’s Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 
YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1942)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 92-93. 
 126. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.4. 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1975). 
 128. Id. Originally, the House Rules recognized a privilege in required reports, 
attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to 
clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other official information, 
and identity of an informer. NOTES OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 
93-650, at 8 (1975). 
 129. Id.  Collateral problems included voluntary waiver by disclosure, disclosure by 
compulsion or without an opportunity to claim privilege, and jury instructions. Id. 
 130. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 501. 
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rules provide otherwise.131  The Conference Committee later adopted 
the House provision, which Congress enacted in 1975.132 
Federal courts generally recognize the traditional common law 
privileges,133 but resist claims of new privileges.134  Although Rule 501 
does not require federal courts to recognize state-created privileges, 
federal courts tend to accept state privileges on the basis of “comity” 
and “reason and experience.”135  Privilege claims are viewed with an 
eye toward underlying values rather than litigation impact.136  
Although pragmatic and utilitarian reasons justify many professional 
privileges, underlying values demand a focus on individual freedom, 
privacy and trust, and ethical and moral convictions to justify a 
privilege.137 
E. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
In 1996, the Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.138  The Court held that confidential 
communications between a psychotherapist and her patient in the 
course of treatment or diagnosis are protected under Rule 501.139  
                                                                                                                 
 131. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1975) (Conf. Rep.). 
 133. MUELLER &, supra note 106, § 5.4 (identifying the common law privileges as 
attorney-client, spousal testimonial, spousal confidential communications, clergyman-
penitent, and qualified privileges for trade secrets, secrets of state, informer’s 
identity, political vote, and the highly qualified journalist’s privilege) (citations 
omitted). 
 134. Id. (noting that federal courts do not recognize an accountant-client privilege, 
physician-patient privilege, and parent-child or other family member privileges other 
than spouses); see also In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining 
to recognize a parent-child privilege). 
 135. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (noting that comity is neither an 
absolute obligation nor courtesy and good will); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 126, § 5.4. 
 136. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 126, § 5.4. 
 137. Id.  In contrast to Wigmore’s four-part test, Mueller and Kirkpatrick suggest 
an alternative six-part test that emphasizes social relationships and moral values. Id.  
Accordingly, proposed new privileges should examine: “(1) the importance to the 
community of the relationship sought to be protected; (2) whether community values 
would be offended by governmental intrusion into the privacy of the relationship; (3) 
the extent to which social traditions and professional standards create a reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality in such a relationship; (4) whether the purpose of the 
relationship depends on full and open communication; (5) the extent to which such 
communication would be impeded if it goes unprotected by a privilege; and (6) the 
benefits to the public from encouraging the communication and protecting the 
privacy of the relationship in comparison to the cost to the litigation process resulting 
from the loss of evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 138. 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 139. Id. at 15. 
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Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, analogized to the spousal 
and attorney-client privilege and found that reason and experience 
demonstrate the psychotherapist-patient privilege “promotes 
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative 
evidence.”140  The privilege covers all confidential communications 
made to licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers 
acting in the course of psychotherapy.141 
Jaffee, however, presented a unique case where the plaintiff sought 
the defendant’s psychotherapy records.142  Defendant-Mary Lu 
Redmond, a former police officer in Illinois, had responded to a 
“fight in progress” at an apartment complex.143  When Redmond 
approached the building, several men burst out of the building, one 
waving a pipe and one—Ricky Allen—brandishing a butcher knife.144  
Redmond shot and killed Allen, who allegedly disregarded 
Redmond’s commands and “was about to stab the man he was 
chasing.”145  Allen’s estate filed a civil rights suit alleging excessive 
force under Section 1983.146  During trial, the plaintiff presented 
evidence that contradicted Redmond’s story, including testimony that 
Redmond drew her gun before exiting the squad car and that Allen 
was unarmed.147  When the plaintiff sought to discover notes from a 
licensed social worker that Redmond saw after the shooting, 
Redmond refused to turn them over.148  The jury was allowed to draw 
an adverse inference and, subsequently, found for Allen’s estate.149  
The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed and concluded that “reason 
and experience” among all fifty states who had adopted the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege barred disclosure.150 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. at 9-10 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“Like the 
spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is ‘rooted 
in the imperative need for confidence and trust.’”)). 
 141. Id. at 15. 
 142. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 143. Id. at 4. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Petitioner also filed suit for damages and 
wrongful-death. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-2.2 (1994). 
 147. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 5-6.  The jury awarded the petitioner $45,000 on the federal claim and 
$500,000 on the state-law claim. Id. 
 150. Id. at 6; Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355, 1358 (7th  Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recognized in light of therapy 
records with minimal probative value as compared with Redmond’s substantial 
privacy interests).   
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Seventh Circuit case 
because other circuit courts had split on whether to recognize a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501.151  Although 
recognizing the privilege, the Court’s rationale in Jaffee was 
exclusively instrumental.152  As the Court noted, the imperative for 
confidence, trust, and effective psychotherapy requires “[a patient] to 
make frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, 
and fears.”153  The psychotherapist-patient privilege serves the 
“mental health of our citizenry . . . a public good of transcendent 
importance.”154  Finally, the Court reasoned, all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.155  
To effectuate the privilege, Jaffee said patients “must be able to 
predict with some degree of certainty” the confidentiality of 
conversations with psychotherapists: “An uncertain privilege, or one 
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications 
by courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”156  Jaffee, therefore, 
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s balancing of privacy interests against 
disclosure and, instead, adopted an absolute psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.157 
But could the patient waive her psychotherapist privilege?  Jaffee 
only recognized the possibility of waiver in a footnote, without 
reference to the circumstances of waiver.158  In fact, the Court refused 
to “speculate about most future developments in the federal 
psychotherapist privilege.”159  But the comparison of waiver to “other 
testimonial privileges” paved the way for future courts to reason by 
analogy—whether to the attorney-client or spousal privilege—in 
making waiver determinations. 
Justice Scalia, joined in part by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.160  
Justice Scalia focused on the instrumental rationale motivating the 
privilege (“successful psychotherapy treatment”) and the traditional 
judicial preference for truth in arguing that the Court created an ill-
                                                                                                                 
 151. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted). 
 152. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 99. 
 153. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10. 
 154. Id. at 11. 
 155. Id. at 12. 
 156. Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
 157. Id. at 17-18. 
 158. Id. at 15 n.14 (“Like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course 
waive the protection.”). 
 159. Id. at 18 n.19. 
 160. Id. at 18. 
2016] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 933 
defined privilege by including social workers.161  As an instrument 
that may prevent proving a valid claim or establishing a valid defense, 
Justice Scalia argued that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would 
transform courts of law into “instruments of wrong” as opposed to 
justice.162  Justice Scalia also questioned whether the normal rules of 
evidence would even undermine psychotherapy.163 
Since Jaffee, some scholars have challenged the instrumental 
rationale for the psychotherapist-patient privilege on empirical 
grounds.164  Confidentiality is important in the therapeutic 
relationship, while an evidentiary privilege is not.165  Instead, the 
Supreme Court could have better justified the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege through a “humanistic rationale” that emphasized privacy, 
autonomy, and the vindication of civil rights.166  These deontological 
rationales are more congruent with democratic principles, principles 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege actually serves, as opposed to 
paternalistic medical advice.167 
II.  DETERMINING WHEN THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE IS WAIVED 
Privileges belong to the holder, who may assert or waive the 
privilege.168  Professional privileges usually belong to the person 
receiving professional services (i.e., the client, not the lawyer; the 
patient, not the psychotherapist).169  Voluntary disclosures in court or 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. at 19-22. 
 162. Id. at 19. 
 163. Id. at 22, 27; see also id. at 22 (“For most of history, men and women have 
worked out their difficulties by talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends, 
and bartenders.”); cf. id. at 16, 27-28 (“Today social workers provide a significant 
amount of mental health treatment. Their clients often include the poor and those of 
modest means who could not afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist, 
but whose counseling sessions serve the same public goals.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 164. See generally DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER, THE 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 113 (1987); 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying 
the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature on Self-Disclosure, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 707 (2004). 
 165. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 101 n.130. 
 166. Id. (citing EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY 
PRIVILEGES § 6.2.7, at 507 (2002)). 
 167. Id. (citing EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY 
PRIVILEGES § 6.2.7, at 509-12 (2002)). 
 168. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.11. 
 169. Id.  Professional providers, however, may claim the privilege for the holder in 
court unless the holder has waived the privilege. Id. 
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to third parties are universal waivers, but psychotherapists also have 
an affirmative duty to disclose patient conversations upon a 
reasonable determination that the patient “poses a serious danger of 
violence to others.”170  Because this Note only focuses on civil rights 
actions brought by incarcerated persons, that duty falls outside the 
scope of its analysis.  This Part reviews express and implied waivers as 
well as exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  This Part 
focuses specifically on the three approaches to implied waivers:  
broad, narrow, and the “middle” view compromise. 
A. The General Framework:  Express and Implied Waivers and 
Privilege Exceptions 
Voluntary and knowing conduct on the part of the privilege holder 
are the operative components of waiver.  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “waive” as “[t]o abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, 
privilege, right, etc.); to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily. []   
Ordinarily, to waive a right one must do it knowingly — with 
knowledge of the relevant facts.”171  During litigation, privilege 
waivers occur when a holder makes a voluntary disclosure or fails to 
invoke the privilege.172 
Courts recognize two types of waivers:  express and implied.173  
Express waivers are an “autonomous choice by the holder” and 
usually involve signing a release or contract.174  Express waivers have 
an “intent” requirement, meaning that the actor must understand the 
act and its consequences.175  Implied waivers, on the other hand, 
occur when the privilege holder fails to exercise a right or loses a right 
based on the holder’s decision “directly related to the right in 
question.”176  Privileges are also limited by several exceptions based 
on the content of the communication.177  For example, a privilege 
never attaches when a patient threatens to harm others (“dangerous 
patient exception”),178 commits criminal fraud, or commits a tort.179  
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1974). 
 171. Waive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 172. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.4. 
 173. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 103. 
 174. Id. at 103-04. 
 175. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 314 (2003). 
 176. Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 
478, 480-84 (1981). But see An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 103 (questioning 
the very notion of “implied” waiver). 
 177. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 104. 
 178. See discussion supra Part I.C.  Courts vary on the “dangerous patient 
exception.” Compare United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998) 
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Courts, however, only consider waiver after a privilege has 
attached.180  This Note only considers the scope of implied waivers of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Express waivers are 
voluntarily, knowingly, and conclusively waived.  This Note considers 
whether civil actions brought by incarcerated persons constitute a 
voluntary and knowing waiver. 
B. Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
Because Jaffee recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege for 
the defendant in a civil action, the Court did not address the issue of 
waiver for a plaintiff’s civil action.181  Further, Jaffee only recognized 
that a waiver may occur without specifying under what 
circumstances.182  Whether plaintiffs impliedly waive their 
psychotherapist-patient privilege often turns on the extent to which 
the plaintiff places their mental or emotional state “at issue.”183 
Federal courts frequently adopt evidentiary privilege exceptions 
identified in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.184  Proposed 
Rule 504, in particular, had set out three exceptions to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege:  (1) hospitalization proceedings; (2) 
court-ordered examinations; and (3) in litigation where the patient’s 
mental condition is an element of the claim or defense.185  Exception 
three, the “patient-litigant exception,” provides that if a patient places 
a sufficient degree of her mental state “in issue,” the adverse party 
may discover the patient’s psychotherapy records.186  This is the same 
consideration as an implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. 
This Part reviews the circuit court decisions—and seminal district 
court cases—that delineate the scope of the “patient-litigant 
exception.”187  Courts either adopt a “broad” view granting total 
waiver, a “narrow” view requiring the plaintiff to place privileged 
communications in issue, or a “middle” view that preserves the 
                                                                                                                 
(recognizing the “dangerous patient exception”), with United States v. Chase, 340 
F.3d 978, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding no dangerous patient exception). 
 179. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 104. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996). 
 183. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 104. 
 184. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. 
Redmond: Where Do We Go From Here?, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1341, 1373-74 (1998). 
 185. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 504(d)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972). 
 186. Poulin, supra note 184, at 1376. 
 187. Id. 
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privilege only for “garden variety” claims of mental or emotional 
distress.188 
C. The Majority Rule: “Broad View” on Waiver of the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a 
“broad” view as to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.189  
The broad view holds that placing one’s mental state at issue, even 
through a non-specific claim of damages for mental or emotional 
distress, waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege.190  Courts 
permit defendants’ requests for privileged material with minimal 
review and waive the privilege regardless of the plaintiff’s intention to 
call an expert to testify on their mental condition.191  Thus, all 
psychotherapist-patient communications are discoverable under the 
broad view.192 
In 1997, soon after Jaffee, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
adopted the broad view in Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co.193  Sarko 
has proven to be a seminal decision for its analysis and subsequent 
influence on federal courts.194  In Sarko, the plaintiff sued former 
employer-defendant under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).195  Sarko’s employer had fired her for chronic tardiness.196  
Sarko, however, alleged that her employer failed to reasonably 
accommodate her clinical depression, which required a medication 
that made it difficult for the plaintiff to wake up in the morning.197 
The Sarko court held that plaintiff placed her mental condition 
“directly at issue” through an ADA claim.198  The court identified 
three reasons for its decision: (1) pre-Jaffee precedent on waiver; (2) 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Id. 
 189. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107; see Fisher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 
361 F. App’x 974, 978 (10th Cir. 2010); Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 
815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 190. See, e.g., Speaker ex rel. Speaker v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 
1105, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 191. Id.; see also An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107. 
 192. Speaker, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1118; An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107. 
 193. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 
189 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 194. See An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 115; Poulin, supra note 184, at 
1376 n.165. 
 195. Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 129. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 130. 
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similarity to waiver of attorney-client privilege when advice (here, 
one’s “mental condition”) is placed at issue; and (3) that fairness and 
justice caution against “allowing a plaintiff to hide . . . behind a claim 
of privilege.”199  A privilege, the court stated, cannot and should not 
be used as a sword to advance litigation as well as a shield to guard 
against discoverable evidence.200  Plaintiffs who claim mental or 
emotional distress must release all confidential communications 
relevant to their mental condition.201 
Soon after the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided Sarko, the 
Eighth Circuit found Sarko202 and three similar district court 
decisions203 persuasive and adopted the broad view of waiver.204  In 
Schoffstall v. Henderson, the plaintiff sued the postal service for sex 
discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment.205  Although 
Schoffstall moved for a protective order206 and invoked her 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court denied the motion.207  
Schoffstall held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege may be 
waived by placing one’s mental condition at issue by claiming 
emotional distress.208  Similarly, in 2010, the Tenth Circuit, in Fisher 
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., followed Schoffstall’s precise 
reasoning in finding that a request for emotional-distress damages 
placed one’s psychological state in issue and waived the privilege.209 
In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner held in Doe v. Oberweis 
Dairy that: “If a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200. See Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(quoting Inserra v. Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A., 1995 WL 54402 (D.N.H. 1995) 
(citations omitted) (commenting on attorney-client privilege)). 
 201. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 230; see also Poulin, supra note 184, at 1377 (“In 
Sarko, given the fact that the plaintiff’s claim was founded on a specific medical 
condition, proving her claim probably would have required the testimony of her 
therapist or of an expert. Thus, a narrow waiver court would likely have reached a 
similar result under these facts.”). But see An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 
134 (noting that federal courts are too preoccupied with the definition of disability 
and, therefore, require proof that requires a broad waiver of privilege). 
 202. Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130. 
 203. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225 (D.N.J. 2000); Vann v. 
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Springfield, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 346, 349-50 (C.D. 
Ill. 1997); E.E.O.C. v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997). 
 204. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 205. Id. at 821. 
 206. Id. at 823; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
 207. Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 823. 
 208. Id. (analogizing to waiver of attorney-client privilege by placing the attorney’s 
representation at issue). 
 209. Fisher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 361 F. App’x 974, 978 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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places his or her psychological state in issue, the defendant is entitled 
to discover any record of that state.”210  Doe involved a sixteen-year-
old part-time ice cream “scooper” who sued her shift supervisor for 
sexual harassment that culminated in sexual intercourse.211  The shift 
supervisor was prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for statutory 
rape.212  Plaintiff appealed after the district court overruled her 
objection to disclosing her psychotherapy records, and upon 
disclosure subsequently caused her to limit her claim to emotional 
distress.213 
Unlike the courts in Jaffee or Schoffstall, Judge Posner analogized 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the “doctor-patient 
privilege.”214  He also employed a balancing provision where the 
judge could review plaintiff’s psychiatric records under seal in the 
interest of privacy.215  Ironically, there is no federal doctor-patient 
privilege (nor is there one in the Proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence), and Jaffee explicitly rejected the balancing test.216  More 
concretely, Judge Posner noted that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure would entitle the defendant to demand a psychiatric 
examination of the plaintiff.217  But Doe’s broad language could also 
endorse the “middle” or “garden variety” view, and even the 
“narrow” view, depending on the severity of the emotional distress 
and how the plaintiff places his or her psychological state in issue.218 
Last, the Sixth Circuit has held that any claim for emotional 
distress damages waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by 
putting one’s emotional state at issue.219  In Maday v. Public Libraries 
of Saginaw, plaintiff Maday sued for age discrimination after 
receiving negative performance reviews and termination from 
Saginaw Public Library.220  During the trial, Maday introduced 
records from meetings with a social worker as proof of emotional 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 211. Id. at 707. 
 212. Id. at 707-08 (noting that the age of consent in Illinois rises to eighteen if the 
accused holds a “position of trust, authority, or supervision”). 
 213. Id. at 708. 
 214. Id. at 718. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996); Helen A. Anderson, The 
Psychotherapist Privilege: Privacy and “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 117, 133 n.90 (2013). 
 217. Doe, 456 F.3d at 718 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 26). 
 218. Anderson, supra note 216, at 133. 
 219. Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 220. Id. at 816-17. 
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distress damages.221  Defendant library then introduced additional 
conversations between Maday and her social worker about an on-
going disagreement on legal strategy with her attorney as an 
alternative cause for her emotional distress.222  On appeal for 
admission of privileged information, the Sixth Circuit ignored the fact 
that the plaintiff had introduced records from her session with a social 
worker.223  Instead of citing Maday’s specific conduct (e.g., 
introducing records), the Sixth Circuit held that seeking emotional-
distress damages puts one’s emotional state at issue and waives the 
privilege.224  
D. The Minority Rule: “Narrow View” Preserving the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
The Second and D.C. Circuits have adopted a narrower approach 
to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.225  The “narrow” 
view declines to find a waiver unless the plaintiff affirmatively places 
privileged communications in issue or lists her psychotherapist as a 
witness for trial.226  The narrow waiver closely parallels the attorney-
client privilege227—as articulated in Jaffee228—and does not reach 
claims for emotional damages.229 
Soon after Sarko, Massachusetts’s district court rejected the broad 
view and, instead, affirmed Jaffee’s proscription against balancing 
privacy and the need for evidence.230  In Vanderbilt v. Town of 
Chilmark, plaintiff Vanderbilt had alleged gender discrimination and 
retaliation against defendant Town of Chilmark, and claimed 
emotional damages.231  The court denied Chilmark’s motion to 
compel discovery of Vanderbilt’s therapeutic records and to depose 
her therapist.232  Vanderbilt held that waiver only occurs when the 
patient: (1) explicitly waives it; (2) discloses privileged material; or (3) 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Id. at 820. 
 222. Id. at 820-21. 
 223. Id. at 820. 
 224. Id. at 821 (citations omitted). 
 225. See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 117 (2d Cir. 2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 
384, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 226. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107. 
 227. See Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 228. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). 
 229. McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1381-82. 
 230. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229. 
 231.  Id. at 225. 
 232.  Id. at 230. 
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uses privileged material as evidence to support a claim or defense.233  
Otherwise, the substance of psychiatric care, counseling, and therapy 
would remain privileged.234 
For example, in the context of attorney-client privilege, a plaintiff 
waives the privilege when using attorney advice as a defense or suing 
an attorney for malpractice.235  A claim for attorney’s fees, however, 
does not waive the privilege.236  In Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, the 
Northern District of Illinois adopted a similar rationale.237  In Hucko, 
plaintiff filed an excessive force and misconduct claim against the city 
and its police officers under Section 1983.238  Hucko held that the 
plaintiff had not impliedly waived his psychotherapist-patient 
privilege by merely seeking damages for humiliation, emotional 
distress, and pain and suffering.239  Although a plaintiff may waive the 
privilege by calling an independent expert or presenting evidence of a 
past psychotherapy consultation to bolster a claim for emotional 
distress, the plaintiff did not intend to offer medical testimony and did 
not place his diagnosis or treatment at issue.240 
In 2007, the D.C. Circuit found Vanderbilt’s reasoning and analogy 
to attorney-client privilege more persuasive than the broad view 
decisions of the Seventh and Eight Circuits.241  In Koch v. Cox, 
plaintiff Koch sued his employer, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), alleging discrimination, retaliation, and failure to 
accommodate his medical condition.242  Although Koch 
acknowledged that he suffered from depression during discovery, he 
                                                                                                                 
 233.  Id. at 228. 
 234.  Id.; see also McDonnell, supra 21, at 1382. 
 235.  Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229. 
 236.  Id. 
 237. Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“[T]he 
principles governing implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege should apply in 
determining what is sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.”) (citing Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1175 n.1 (7th 
Cir. 1995); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 
1984)). 
 238. Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 527. 
 239. Id.  However, the plaintiff impliedly waived his psychotherapist-patient 
privilege for maintaining that “preoccupation” with treatment or the effects of 
various medications were the reason why he failed to file suit within the applicable 
statutory limitations. Id. 
 240. Id. at 529. 
 241. Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Doe v. 
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2006); Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 
823 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 80. 
 242. Koch, 489 F.3d at 386. 
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had not claimed emotional distress damages.243  During discovery, the 
SEC sought Koch’s psychotherapy records because he “had put his 
mental state in issue and thereby waived the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.”244 
The D.C. Circuit, however, held that the broad view of waiver is a 
standard that sub silentio overrules Jaffee by eviscerating the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.245  Waiving the privilege for any 
party involved in litigation with a mental element—who just so 
happens to have received psychotherapy in the past—would 
eviscerate that privilege.246  Waiver does not occur when a plaintiff 
acknowledges that he or she suffers from depression.247  Nor may a 
defendant place the plaintiff’s mental state in issue and overcome the 
privilege.248  Waiver, therefore, should only occur in circumstances 
similar to waiver of the attorney-client privilege: when a plaintiff 
bases a claim on communication with his psychotherapist or 
selectively uses such communication to gain an advantage in 
litigation.249 
The Second Circuit agreed with Koch.250  In In re Sims, the court 
held that a broad view of waiver would effectively eviscerate the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege and overrule Jaffee.251  In Sims, the 
Second Circuit reversed a trial court order to disclose plaintiff’s 
psychiatric records in an excessive force case brought by an 
incarcerated person against two correctional officers.252  Although 
Sims had withdrawn his claim for emotional distress damages,253 
defendants sought Sim’s mental health records to impeach his 
credibility at trial.254  Defendants actually argued that Sims’s 
excessive force claim raised the question of whether Sims started the 
fight “due to uncontrolled aggression, a persecution complex, or some 
                                                                                                                 
 243. Id. at 389. 
 244. Id. at 387. 
 245. Id. at 390. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 391. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted). 
 250. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 134 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 141. 
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suicidal tendencies.” Id. at 135 (citations omitted). 
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other psychological problem.”255  The Second Circuit summarily 
rejected this argument because starting a fight has no bearing on 
whether “Sims was motivated by such a mental condition.”256 
As the Second Circuit reasoned, Sims had claimed physical injuries 
not serious emotional injuries.257  In fact, Sims only testified to 
dreaming about the assault and becoming anxious upon seeing a 
corrections officer holding a knife.258  He did not claim to suffer 
mental injuries, nor did he claim to receive treatment for any mental 
or emotional injuries.259  The court noted that merely stating that one 
suffers from depression or anxiety does not waive the privilege, nor, 
can an opposing party place one’s mental state “in issue” based on 
this information.260  Only by disclosing or introducing some privileged 
material would a party waive the privilege.261  In sum, Sims had not 
used privileged material as a “sword” to advance litigation while 
simultaneously trying to “shield” privileged communications from 
scrutiny.262 
E. The Compromise: A “Middle View” that Preserves the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege for “Garden Variety” Claims of 
Emotional Distress 
Both the broad view and narrow view agree that calling a mental 
health professional as an expert witness would constitute a waiver of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.263  The distinction between the 
two views turns on claims for emotional distress damages.264  
Plaintiffs that claim only emotional distress damages need not 
produce an expert or introduce their mental health records.265  A 
party can prove emotional distress damages through its own 
                                                                                                                 
 255. Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
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 260. Id. at 134 (quoting Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
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testimony, and an opposing party may then depose the testifying 
party during discovery.266 
As a result, several courts have differentiated claims of “garden 
variety emotional distress” from claims of mental injury or “serious” 
emotional distress.267  Seven years before Jaffee, in a civil rights case 
alleging racial discrimination, the District Court of Massachusetts 
recognized that claiming “garden variety” emotional distress does not 
place one’s mental condition at issue in litigation.268  In Sabree v. 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Sabree, the plaintiff, 
alleged that a union unlawfully denied him membership because of 
his race.269  Sabree sought damages for lost wages and emotional 
distress.270  When the union requested Sabree’s psychotherapy 
records, Sabree asserted his psychotherapist-patient privilege.271 
The Sabree court employed a four-pronged test to determine 
whether the court should recognize or disclose the evidentiary 
privilege: (1) Would courts recognize such a privilege?; (2) Is the 
asserted privilege “intrinsically meritorious”?; (3) Should such a 
privilege be actively fostered?; and (4) would disclosure injure the 
relationship more than benefit the court proceeding?272  The Sabree 
court found that all four-prongs had been met to preserve the 
privilege: Massachusetts recognized the psychotherapist privilege to 
foster treatment and advance society’s mental health.273  Further, the 
court found that Sabree’s privacy interest “overwhelmingly” 
outweighed any benefit to the defendant-Union, and the records at 
issue were “perspicuously irrelevant to the instant lawsuit.”274  The 
court concluded by asserting that no exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege applies because Sabree had claimed “garden variety” 
emotional distress, not psychological injuries and psychiatric 
disorders, as damages.275 
Similarly, in Johnson v. Trujillo, the plaintiff brought a personal 
injury suit after a motor vehicle accident with Trujillo, the 
                                                                                                                 
 266. See Nelken, supra note 265, at 25. 
 267. See An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 112; Kent & Kent, supra note 
21, at 480. 
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 269. See id. at 423. 
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 273. Id. at 425-26. 
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defendant.276  During her deposition, Johnson described the fallout 
from the accident to be “very upsetting” and “extremely emotional 
and scary.”277  She also expressed concern about having to undergo 
future surgery.278  Trujillo then sought Johnson’s psychiatric and 
marriage-counseling records because she had “injected her mental 
condition into the case” and claimed more than ordinary damages.279 
The Johnson court held that “bare allegations of mental anguish, 
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life” 
did not place plaintiff’s mental condition at issue.280  Only placing the 
specific mental or emotional condition at issue would contravene 
fairness and justice.281  If Johnson had called her psychiatrist as a 
witness to further a damages claim, the court would have ruled 
differently.282  In such a situation, the privilege would become a sword 
to advance the plaintiff’s litigation. 
Courts tend to find psychiatric diagnoses or treatment as moving 
beyond the realm of “garden variety” emotional distress.283  Yet, 
diagnoses and treatment reveal little about an individual’s conscious 
subjective sensation of an emotional injury.284  But anything beyond 
subjective sensation, such as producing records to support a severity 
claim, would require mental health records or expert testimony that 
would waive the privilege.285 
Still, the District of New Jersey has held that claiming emotional 
distress while pursuing or continuing to receive psychotherapy waives 
the privilege.286  In Jackson v. Chubb Corp., the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey considered a protective order to prevent 
discovery of plaintiff’’s mental health records after plaintiff sued her 
former-employer for race discrimination.287  Jackson not only wanted 
to vindicate her rights, but also needed to receive mental health 
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 279. Id. at 154. 
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treatment because she had been diagnosed as seriously depressed and 
had experienced hallucinations in the past.288 
After assessing the case law supporting the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, Jackson criticized the narrow view of waiver for failing to 
reconcile its position with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) 
(Rule 35(a)), which permits courts to order a mental examination 
when a plaintiff places her mental condition at issue.289  Because 
mandated psychiatric exams are no less intrusive than disclosing 
treatment records, the Jackson court held that failure to question 
Rule 35(a)’s fairness of the “at issue” rule made fairness in 
consideration of waiver insignificant.290  Jackson, therefore, held that 
the broad view of waiver best serves party interests and adequately 
addresses fairness issues considered in other courts.291 
The Jackson court, however, carved out claims of “garden variety” 
emotional distress from claims that place a mental condition at issue 
because it does not satisfy Rule 35(a)’s requirement that the “mental 
condition” must be “in controversy.”292  Several courts have held that 
mental anguish or “garden variety” emotional distress does not place 
plaintiff’s mental condition in controversy.293  Although the Jackson 
court recognized the Hobson’s choice between unfettered 
psychotherapy and a plaintiff’s right to pursue litigation, the court 
found it more inequitable to bar a defendant from gathering 
necessary evidence.294  To preserve the privilege and prevent 
disclosure, plaintiffs must abandon or limit their claims to “garden 
variety” emotional distress, regardless of the actual damage 
incurred.295 
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English dictionaries define “garden variety” as “[o]rdinary, 
common, or unexceptional.”296  “Garden variety” emotional distress 
is a legal—not medical term—that gives judges considerable 
discretion to decide what falls within its scope.297  The District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois defined “garden variety” 
emotional damages in Santelli v. Electro-Motive as “negative 
emotions that [a plaintiff] experienced as the intrinsic result of 
defendant’s alleged conduct, [such as] humiliation, embarrassment, 
and other similar emotions.”298  However, “garden variety” emotions 
do not include “any resulting symptoms or conditions that [one] 
might have suffered, [including] sleeplessness, nervousness, [and] 
depression.”299  The Santelli court cites no legal or scientific authority 
for excluding sleeplessness, nervousness, and depression.300  In fact, 
judicial discretion is so wide and varied that some courts have ordered 
magistrate judges to conduct in camera reviews of medical records 
before determining the scope and extent of permissible emotional 
distress claims.301 
More recently, in Flowers v. Owens, the Northern District of 
Illinois considered whether persistent fear, anxiety, and depression 
about leaving the house (i.e., subtle agoraphobia) qualified as 
“garden variety” emotional distress.302  Flowers, the plaintiff, sued 
Will County Correctional Facility after being detained and beaten in 
custody.303  After the incident, Flowers feared retaliation from law 
enforcement, especially the people involved in the case.304  The 
Flowers court held that the plaintiff could testify generally about 
“humiliation, embarrassment, anger, and feeling depressed, anxious 
and dejected,” but could not testify about resulting symptoms or 
persistent conditions and maintain the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.305 
Flowers could not testify that he feared retaliation, leaving home, 
or thinking about the incident every day because these symptoms are 
                                                                                                                 
 296.  Garden Variety, WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/garden_variety 
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indicative of agoraphobia or PTSD.306  As the court noted, 
agoraphobia and PTSD are disorders classifiable in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), not “garden 
variety” emotional distress.307  The Flowers court thus reaffirmed the 
Jackson court’s reading that even a description of “garden variety” 
emotional distress symptoms overcomes the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.308  Emotional distress, therefore, must not reach beyond the 
purely subjective and most general-description of an emotional 
response to a civil wrong. 
III.  THE SCOPE OF WAIVER IN PRISON LITIGATION: DAMAGES, 
FAIRNESS, AND MOVING BEYOND “GARDEN VARIETY” 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Part III of this Note analyzes the broad, narrow, and middle views 
on waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege through legal, 
policy, and normative frameworks.  Tort law principles, fairness in 
litigation, confidentiality in guarding against social stigma, and the 
context of incarceration all militate in favor of the narrow approach 
to waiver.  This Part argues against the “broad” view and critiques the 
growing “middle” view of the psychotherapist-patient waiver.  In 
particular, the “garden variety” approach to waiver takes the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege out of the holder’s hands and places 
it within the judge’s vision of “normal” emotions.309  This Note 
concludes that in the context of prison litigation, imposing “garden 
variety” or “normative” limits on emotional distress—such as those 
experienced by an imagined “healthy, well-adjusted person”—is 
biased, unrealistic, and discriminatory against incarcerated persons. 
A. Damages: The “Eggshell-Plaintiff” Rule and Apportionment 
Legal causation provides attorneys with creative avenues to argue 
for or against admissible evidence.310  Civil defendants frequently 
offer evidence of an alternative factual cause to a plaintiff’s injuries to 
avoid or mitigate liability.311  Alternative causes also require findings 
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on the “apportionment” of the injury caused by a defendant’s 
actions.312  For civil rights plaintiffs that claim mental or emotional 
injuries, defendants frequently pursue alternative causation theories 
centered on the plaintiff’s mental health history.  It is important to 
note, however, that causation is different from valuating the harm of 
an injury—that is, damages.313  Moreover, the subjective nature of 
mental or emotional injuries makes apportionment of the injury 
nearly impossible to calculate.314  If a court attempted to apportion a 
mental or emotional injury based on a plaintiff’s mental health 
history, it would only engage in ungrounded speculation. 
Tort law relies on the “eggshell-skull plaintiff” rule to guide courts 
in valuating damages for plaintiffs with preexisting conditions.315  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the “eggshell-skull plaintiff” as “[a] 
plaintiff whose physical or mental condition makes the person 
exceptionally vulnerable to injury.”316  Tortfeasors must take their 
victim as they find them regardless of susceptibility.  Defendants, 
therefore, are liable for damages that exacerbate the plaintiff’s 
preexisting condition; not what is expected to happen to the “ordinary 
person.”317  Furthermore, defendants may only apportion damages to 
other causes when harms are distinct or reasonably divisible.318  
Otherwise, the harm is “indivisible” when no logical division is 
apparent.319  Mental or emotional states, injuries, or distress are often 
context-dependent and vary considerably over time.  By the very 
nature of mental and emotional states, it is near impossible to 
apportion a single cause to a subjective condition, especially for a 
third-party fact finder.320  Courts, however, still allow attenuated 
speculation into a mental or emotional injury: if the plaintiff had not 
suffered anxiety, depression, or insomnia, the mental or emotional 
injury would have never occurred.321  But a plaintiff’s preexisting 
condition or past experience with anxiety, depression, or insomnia 
does not automatically relate to a similar response proximately 
caused by a civil rights violation. 
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 313. See id. at 762. 
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For claims of mental or emotional injury in prison, the “eggshell-
skull plaintiff” rule is significant because the experience of 
incarceration involves coercive arrest, the loss of privacy, and 
exposure to violence in correctional institutions.322  Many prisoners 
experience PTSD, panic attacks, depression, paranoia, and a sense of 
helplessness from these highly stressful and traumatic events.323  
Furthermore, civil rights violations carry their own incumbent mental 
or emotional injuries.324  Life-altering fear, anxieties, trauma, and 
accompanying physical symptoms, such as insomnia and indigestion, 
are all common.325  As a consequence of history and context, 
incarcerated persons are more susceptible to preexisting conditions 
and aggravated mental or emotional injuries subsequent to a civil 
rights violation.326  Because tortfeasors must take their victim as they 
exist in this particularized context, they are responsible for the 
exacerbation of damages claimed by the victim regardless of his or 
her past mental health history.327  A civil defendant that attempts to 
mitigate damages based on past mental health treatment moves 
beyond the valuation of damages.328 
Yet, the broad approach to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege permits defendants to plumb the plaintiff’s entire mental 
health history to mitigate damages and explore alternative theories of 
causation.329  Broad view courts posit that claims of mental or 
emotional injury create a legal matter “at issue.”330  When courts 
grant a broad waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, they 
usurp the plaintiff-privilege holder’s right to decide whether or not to 
put forward his preexisting condition.  In fact, broad waivers provide 
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the defense with irrelevant and, sometimes, stigmatizing 
information.331 
The middle view of waiver more appropriately adopts tort 
principles by excluding claims for “garden variety” emotional distress.  
Underlying psychological conditions are irrelevant when considering 
a plaintiff’s emotional response to a civil rights violation.  But the 
middle view discounts the traumatic experience of incarceration and 
civil rights violations.332  It ignores personal histories of abuse, racial 
discrimination, poverty, oppression, and the on-going invasion of 
privacy and identity reconstruction taking place in prison.333  The 
middle view, therefore, is insufficient. 
In the context of prison litigation, the narrow view of waiver proves 
most reasonable.  The narrow view mirrors the attorney-client 
privilege by keeping the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the 
privilege holder’s hands.334  If the plaintiff makes a claim for 
exacerbated injuries through proof of a preexisting condition, the 
plaintiff may voluntarily waive his privilege to introduce relevant 
evidence.  Once a plaintiff proves his preexisting condition, the 
“eggshell-skull plaintiff” rule would hold a defendant liable for the 
damages proximately caused by their wrong.  Moreover, the privilege 
stops defendants from engaging in attenuated speculation into 
alternative causes of a mental or emotional injury.  Ultimately, the 
narrow approach prevents defendants from grafting past subjective 
states onto the present injury litigated in court. 
B. Fairness: Truth-Seeking, Vindicating Prisoner Rights, and 
Confidentiality as a Means to Guard Against the Stigma of Mental 
Illness 
To effectuate justice and protect individual rights, courts must 
objectively weigh evidence and provide litigants with a fair hearing.  
Courts consider fairness to parties in litigation when deciding whether 
to admit or exclude evidence, including whether to invoke a broad, 
narrow, or middle approach to the scope of the waiver.335  This Part 
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conducts a three-pronged analysis of fairness considerations for the 
implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege: (1) truth-
seeking in discovery; (2) not chilling civil rights actions; and (3) 
preserving confidential information that may be used to impeach, 
discredit, and stigmatize the plaintiff.  Although the broad view of 
waiver would expand the domain of potentially admissible evidence, 
the narrow view of waiver promotes important social policies 
consonant with the goals of evidentiary privileges. 
1. Truth-Seeking During Discovery 
Evidentiary privileges are not favored in the justice system.336  By 
their nature, they obstruct the revelation of probative evidence.337  As 
the institution of justice, courts demand “every man’s evidence in 
search for the truth.”338  However, as the Jaffee court recognized, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege was a “public good transcending the 
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth.”339  Fairness reenters the court as a consideration 
when waiver of the privilege becomes an issue in litigation.  Because 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is an evidentiary privilege, 
courts tend to strictly construe the privilege and favor arguments for 
its waiver.340  The fairness argument, however, must be more than the 
potential to exclude relevant evidence.341  Courts characterize the 
fairness consideration as proscribing the use of the privilege “as a 
sword instead of a shield.”342 
In Johnson v. Trujilo, the court’s fairness assessment of waiver 
supported the “middle view” approach.343  Johnson had claimed 
“garden variety” emotional damages incident to physical injuries—
injuries unrelated to a specific mental or emotional condition at 
issue.344  However, courts that employ the broad view of waiver find 
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any assertion of mental or emotional distress operates as a “sword” to 
advance a claim or defense while, simultaneously, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege “shields” the opposing party from 
reviewing the evidence supporting the claim or defense.345  These 
courts are highly skeptical of the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
and find that nearly all confidential information falls within an 
expansive category of mental or emotional injuries.  Broad view 
courts find all psychotherapist-patient communication relevant and 
helpful to defendants without distinguishing the scope, extent, or type 
of a mental or emotional distress claim made by a plaintiff.346 
Under the “broad” view, fairness for civil rights defendants is the 
primary concern.  Broad view courts hold that it would be unfair to 
deny the defendant an opportunity to inquire into the plaintiff’s past 
“to show alternative causes for her emotional distress.”347  The broad 
view fails on two levels: (1) its fairness argument rests on an 
inactionable relevance argument, and (2) it runs counter to the over-
arching principle of privileges to serve more important social 
interests.348  Moreover, courts that engage in a fairness analysis to 
overcome the psychotherapist-patient privilege ostensibly eviscerate 
the privilege and violate Jaffee’s holding.349 
Narrow view courts, on the other hand, would avoid this tendency 
to favor defendant requests for privileged material.  Because narrow 
waiver courts distinguish the type, extent, and scope of a mental or 
emotional distress claim, only claims that affirmatively place a specific 
condition at issue would waive the privilege.350  Further, a mental or 
emotional injury “in issue” should directly relate to proximate or 
concurrent mental illness, and not “alternative stressors” such as 
divorce or financial stress.351 
2. Vindicating the Rights of the Incarcerated 
Evidentiary privileges are manifestations of “extrinsic social 
policy.”352  They place certain values and social relationships above 
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judicial truth-seeking and efficiency.353  As described in Part I.D of 
this Note, privileges safeguard one’s privacy, freedom, and 
interpersonal trust, especially in certain professional relationships.354  
In a democratic society that values individual rights, these are all 
public goods of “transcendent importance.” 
The psychotherapist-patient privilege belongs to the privilege 
holder.355  As such, fairness analysis should focus on how waiver 
affects the privilege holder.  Notably, broad views on waiver 
effectively chill civil rights litigation, especially for vulnerable 
populations who may have received mental health treatment in the 
past.  Under the broad view, courts force victims of mental or 
emotional injury to make a Hobson’s choice: pursue litigation and 
waive the privilege or do not pursue litigation at all.356  Such an 
approach undermines federal civil rights policy, which seeks to 
vindicate civil rights by making plaintiffs “private attorneys 
general.”357  Vindicating civil rights in corrections redresses acts of 
violence and discrimination so that society at-large, and conduct in 
correctional institutions, might benefit.358 
The middle and narrow views of waiver fall within the letter and 
spirit of Jaffee.  Courts should not review waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege through balancing privacy interests 
and fairness in litigation; nor should the privilege be waived 
automatically upon filing a civil rights suit that alleges mental or 
emotional distress.359  First, erosion of the privilege is not the only 
way to find the truth.360  Defendants may inquire into the past and 
posit alternative theories of causation independent of mental health 
records.  Second, Jaffee effectively prohibited balancing access to 
evidence against the privilege to prevent courts from moving the 
privilege from the hands of the holder to the judge.361  Third, for the 
middle view, non-specific emotional distress is within a layperson’s 
sphere of knowledge.362  Plaintiffs may testify as to their emotional 
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distress without an expert witness to detail the substance of 
psychotherapy.363 
Finally, Jaffee expressed a concern with chilling psychotherapist-
patient communications in the absence of a reliable privilege.364  
Therapists and patients would speak with reservation if the prospect 
of litigation loomed.  But discussing the “restricted issue” may be the 
most important aspect of improving a patient’s mental health.365  
Moreover, plaintiffs interested in maintaining their privacy may forgo 
an emotional distress claim.  Even under the middle view, plaintiffs 
may severely limit their emotional distress claim to preserve their 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.366  Coupled with the PLRA’s 
limitations,367 the broad waiver may effectively foreclose an 
incarcerated person’s redress for mental or emotional injury 
subsequent to a civil rights violation. 
3. Confidentiality to Guard Against Stigma 
Jaffee’s recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege sought 
to foster uninhibited communication during mental health treatment 
through the certainty of confidentiality.  Privileging communication in 
a treatment relationship also protects against the emotional upheaval 
attendant to public revelation of certain information.368  There are 
two harms inherent to revealing a patient’s confidential information: 
(1) making public highly personal information, and (2) the stigma that 
attaches to diagnoses of certain mental health conditions.  Unlike the 
broad and middle views of waiver, the narrow approach would guard 
against the negative social consequences attendant to past behavior or 
medical conditions. 
The stigma that attaches to mental illness grows out of normative 
“sanism” in society and the legal system, which segregates and 
discriminates against people with mental illness, constructing them in 
the public consciousness as “shameful, dangerous, and 
irresponsible.”369  It is ironic that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
exclude other stigmatizing information, such as character, criminal 
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behavior, or sexual behavior,370 but not a plaintiff’s disability.  As a 
result, defendants in civil rights actions have used evidence of a 
plaintiff’s psychiatric diagnosis or treatment to discredit their claim 
and testimony.371 
For example, in the context of prison litigation, mental health 
status frequently comes in to discredit a plaintiff’s testimony.372  
When the plaintiff and other incarcerated persons are the only 
witnesses to a civil rights violation, correctional officers use mental 
health records to undermine the accuracy of their perception of 
events.373  Although witnesses are given a presumption of 
competency, mental disabilities are broadly construed by the public to 
represent an incapacity to recall events accurately.374  Fact-finders 
may “draw inappropriate and prejudicial inferences regarding [a] 
plaintiff’s character and credibility” because American society 
continues to stigmatize mental illness as well as past criminal 
conduct.375 
Unlike most medical diagnoses, mental illness does not evoke 
“empathic” responses.376  Erving Goffman’s classic study of stigma 
placed the problem succinctly as a discrediting, dehumanizing, and 
disempowering attribute.377  Stigma profoundly impacts civil 
litigation; it may end a civil rights claim entirely, because the fact-
finder often rules on the credibility of the plaintiff.378  Moreover, fact 
finders may give inappropriate weight to evidence of mental illness to 
reach conclusions on events, motives, causation, and damages.379  
Plaintiffs may also face issues collateral to trial, including social 
alienation and employment discrimination. 
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Similar concerns about confidentiality and privacy arose in the 
1980s and 1990s for people living with HIV.380  Since the very start of 
the epidemic, HIV-positive individuals have faced employment 
discrimination and social alienation.381  Many feared that a positive 
test result would be made public.382  As a result, states passed strict 
confidentiality protections to avoid discrimination and encourage 
testing.383  With mental illness, confidentiality protections would 
provide a bulwark against discrimination, encourage treatment, and 
allow victims of civil rights violations to bring lawsuits without the 
emotional upheaval of a publicly stigmatizing trial. 
C. Critique of “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress 
In Kunstler v. City of New York, the Southern District of New 
York defined “garden variety” emotional distress as “the distress that 
any healthy, well-adjusted person would likely feel as a result of being 
so victimized [by a civil rights violation].”384  Evidence demonstrative 
of “garden variety” emotional distress includes the plaintiff’s 
testimony that they felt isolated, hurt, shocked, sad, worried, 
embarrassed, or humiliated.385  Psychic injury, the step beyond the 
“garden variety” would include symptoms indicative of PTSD or 
depression, such as heart palpitations, insomnia, agoraphobia, or 
indigestion.386  Courts also consider a plaintiff’s conduct outside of 
court to render determinations as to whether an injury is psychiatric 
or “garden variety” emotional distress.  Courts consider seeking 
psychotherapy after the incident as indicative of psychic injury.387   
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1. Inconsistency Among Courts in Interpreting the Scope of Waiver 
The “garden variety” approach has no genus or species.  It is often 
inconsistent.388  For example, in In re RNC Consolidated Cases, the 
Southern District of New York summarily decided all plaintiff claims 
for mental or emotional injuries went beyond “garden variety” 
emotional damages.389  The court did not bother distinguishing 
“‘mental injury,’ ‘emotional injuries,’ ‘severe emotional distress,’ 
‘embarrassment, humiliation, shock, fright,’ ‘mental anguish,’ and 
‘apprehension.’”390  The court also summarily ignored cases that have 
recognized similar claims of emotional distress and preserved the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.391  Furthermore, the court read In 
re Sims as authoritative support for its “garden variety” analysis, even 
though Sims recognized a narrow approach to waiver.392 
Similar inconsistencies have arisen in the Seventh and Eighth 
Circuits.  After the Doe and Schoffstall courts embraced the broad 
approach to waiver, subsequent district court decisions have 
embraced the “garden variety” view.393  Inconsistency arises when the 
court finds a mental condition “at issue.”394  Thus, the “broad” view 
and “middle” view can co-exist because “garden variety” emotional 
distress may not put a mental condition “at issue.”  However, district 
courts are still at liberty to decide which emotional responses place a 
mental condition “at issue” and waive the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.  Circuit courts and district courts offer little guidance or 
predictability on waiver.  These courts also fail to provide any 
consistent approach to placing a mental condition “at issue” or what 
constitutes “garden variety” emotional distress.  Although judges 
have defined “garden variety” emotional distress,395 in practice the 
term has proven indeterminate and elastic.396 
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2. Discriminatory Impact 
Although seemingly a fair compromise, the “garden variety” 
approach actively discriminates against persons with mental illness.  
Most obviously, the “garden variety” approach privileges patients 
who never sought psychotherapy.397  Civil rights plaintiffs without 
mental health records are free to file claims for mental or emotional 
injuries because they have nothing to waive or disclose.  But plaintiffs 
who have sought psychotherapy in the past may only claim “garden 
variety” emotional distress unless they are willing to disclose their 
entire mental health history to the defendant. 
More importantly, the “garden variety” approach only protects 
plaintiffs whose mental or emotional suffering appears “normal” and 
“ordinary” to the district court judge.398  When judges refer to 
“garden variety” emotional distress, they envision what a 
decontextualized ordinary person would experience.399  But who is 
the reasonably emotionally distressed person?  And do gender, race, 
and incarceration factor into the judge’s consideration?400 
Because most judges and lawyers come from privileged 
backgrounds,401 they should not predetermine a plaintiff’s emotional 
response to civil rights violations, especially for protected classes that 
have experienced discrimination in the past.402  Incarcerated persons, 
in particular, have disproportionately experienced racial 
discrimination, poverty, oppression, and the ongoing invasion of 
privacy and identity reconstruction in prison.403  Any concept that 
accounts for “normal” mental or emotional distress must account for 
the accumulated experiences of discrimination and oppression.404  
But, far too often, the decontextualized ordinary person bears the 
standard.  As a result, “garden variety” emotional distress effectively 
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tells civil rights plaintiffs that something is wrong with them when 
they suffer more than the “reasonable dominant group.”405 
“Garden variety” emotional distress also discriminates against 
persons with mental illness or emotional problems.  It perpetuates the 
stigma of mental illness by placing a person beyond “normal” based 
on their subjective condition.406  Someone with a mental health 
diagnosis, who experiences a civil rights violation, is effectively 
rebuffed as “abnormal” and “unreasonable” should they experience 
emotional distress differently than an “ordinary” civil rights plaintiff. 
3. When “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress Rewrites Civil 
Claims 
The “garden variety” approach does more damage to the truth-
seeking function of courts than any marginally relevant evidence 
protected by a privilege.  It encourages plaintiffs to reduce or 
fictionalize their mental condition or emotional response to preserve 
the privilege.407  For example, in Flowers, describing one’s fears and 
testifying as to the symptoms of emotional distress came too close to 
agoraphobia and PTSD, and the court waived the privilege.408  
Similarly, the Santelli court held that descriptions of sleeplessness, 
nervousness, and depression went beyond the scope of “garden 
variety” emotional distress.409  If one’s emotional distress 
approximates a diagnosable condition in the DSM, courts waive the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.410  Plaintiffs, therefore, are 
encouraged to limit their damage claims and testimony to purely 
subjective statements, such as sadness, humiliation, embarrassment, 
and fear. 
Incarcerated persons may find navigating the “garden” 
extraordinarily difficult.  The “garden” is both ill-defined and 
decontextualized from the experience of prison.  Prisons are not 
open-air patches of flowers, but penal institutions made from 
concrete and steel.  Incarcerated persons who bring civil rights claims 
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may adversely affect their credibility and misrepresent their 
demeanor trying to stay within the garden’s boundaries.411  Lay juries 
may question rights claims arising in prison to an even further extent.  
And, coupled with the enormity of PLRA barriers, these hurdles may 
foreclose the vindication of the rights of the incarcerated. 
CONCLUSION 
Jaffee established an absolute psychotherapist-patient evidentiary 
privilege, but recognized that the privilege may be waived under 
certain circumstances.412  Implied waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege has produced extensive case law and three legal 
categories that govern its scope: broad, narrow, and middle views.413  
Federal courts have varied widely on which approach to adopt and, 
even, on their interpretation of the same categorical approach.414  
Variations either depend on the facts of the case or are entirely 
decontextualized.  Currently, the “broad” view of waiver has won 
over most circuits, but a growing number of district courts have 
qualified the waiver to exclude “garden variety” emotional distress.  
It is foreseeable that the “middle” view will eventually supersede the 
“broad” view.415   
Prison litigation and the realities of incarceration, however, may 
shed new light on the “narrow” approach.  Incarcerated persons who 
wish to vindicate their civil rights after a physical assault may find 
themselves trapped in the labyrinthine “garden” of prison 
litigation.416  Under the broad view of waiver, the Hobson’s choice of 
waiving the privilege and filing suit as opposed to not filing at all is a 
stark reality.  Moreover, the middle view that preserves the privilege 
for “garden variety” claims of mental or emotional distress is 
insufficient.  Incarcerated persons who diminish their claims to fall 
within the “garden” and preserve their privilege may inadvertently 
self-discredit their claim after a physical assault. 
“Normalizing” mental or emotional injuries to simple, subjective 
adjectives runs against tort law principles, undermines federal civil 
rights policy, imposes more barriers upon incarcerated plaintiffs, and 
further excludes persons with mental illness from the law and 
“normal” society.  Courts, therefore, should reconsider the narrow 
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view of waiver in the context of prison litigation, return the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege to the privilege holder, restore legal 
agency to incarcerated civil rights plaintiffs, and guard against the 
stigma of mental illness and imposition of a normative response to 
civil rights violations. 
